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COMMENTS
APPELLATE REVIEW OF GUILTY PLEA
ACCEPTANCES IN FEDERAL COURT: HARMLESS
ERROR IN A RULE 11 PROCEEDING?
INTRODUCTION
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs
the taking of guilty pleas in federal court.' The rule performs a
dual function. On the one hand, it protects defendants by en-
hancing the fairness of a plea proceeding.2 On the other, it ac-
cords to pleas a measure of finality by regulating plea negotia-
tions' and by assuring the maintenance of complete plea-taking
1. Rule 11 was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rulemaking
authority. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-3772 (1970). For a brief overview of its history, see
Note, Revised Federal Rule 11: Tighter Guidelines for Pleas in Criminal Cases, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 1010, 1010-12 (1976). The rule is reproduced in full in Appendix A
infra.
2. The rule provides strict guidelines for the acceptance of guilty pleas by federal
trial judges. See notes 9-19 and accompanying text infra. For the most part, these
guidelines reflect due process standards, described by one commentator as follows:
The standards themselves-that the plea be voluntary, intelligent and
accurate-are simply enough stated. Defining their substantive content
is much more difficult, however, because it reflects multiple and often
contradictory concerns about the propriety and fairness of the guilty plea
process. Moreover, as courts have sought to regulate the plea process by
stretching the traditional standards to cover newly recognized problems,
their substantive content has come to have only an attenuated relation
to familiar concepts of voluntariness, knowledge, and accuracy.
J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GuiLTY PLEAS § 3.01, at 74-75 (1975).
3. FED. R. CraM. P. 11(e). Plea bargaining had long been an "invisible process,"
in part because of its doubtful constitutionality. See J. BOND, supra note 2, § 1.07;
Davis, The Guilty Plea Process: Exploring the Issues of Voluntariness and Accuracy,
6 VAL. U. L. REV. 111, 119-21 (1972); Erickson, The Finality of a Guilty Plea, 48 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 835, 839 (1973). The Supreme Court cleared the uncertainty by recognizing
that legitimate inducements to plead guilty do not render a plea involuntary. See
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 261-62 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1970). See generally
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuiLTY § 3.1, Commentary at 60-69 (Approved
Draft, 1968). A parallel development in the lower appellate courts spawned a variety
of circuit rules which fastened on trial judges the duty to inquire into the existence of
plea bargaining prior to accepting a guilty plea. These courts believed that the failure
to incorporate the terms of a bargain into the plea-taking record left the plea suscepti-
ble to voluntariness challenges. Compelled disclosure would not only enhance the
likelihood that the defendant understood these terms, but also would facilitate rapid
disposition of later allegations that the government failed to live up to its bargain. See
Moody v. United States, 497 F.2d 359, 362-65 (7th Cir. 1974); Bryan v. United States,
492 F.2d 775, 780-82 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); United
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records.'
In reviewing alleged plea-taking errors, federal appellate
courts must strive to accommodate these concerns. Accord-
ingly, the standard of review should strike some balance be-
tween the need to protect a defendant's due process interests5
and the need for finality.'
At present, pleas in federal court are tested against an
exceptionally strict standard of review. Any error in the plea
proceeding is presumed prejudicial and if challenged, automat-
States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637, 639-40 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907
(1974); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 413-15 (3d Cir. 1973); Raines v. United
States, 423 F.2d 526, 530-31 (4th Cir. 1970).
In the wake of these developments, Rule 11 was formally amended to sanction the
practice throughout the federal court system. The rule draftsmen explained that, since
plea negotiations were required as a matter of administrative necessity, it was better
to recognize and regulate the practice than to attempt to abolish it. In this way, the
terms of an agreement could be spelled out in open court and the defendant's under-
standing of the agreed disposition could be reflected in the record of the plea-taking
proceeding. See Notes of the Advisory Committee on 1975 Amendments to Rules, Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1303-05 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 Advisory Committee Notes]. The extent to which this will enhance the
finality of guilty pleas remains uncertain. Note, Rule 11 and Collateral Attack on
Guilty Pleas, 86 YALE L.J. 1395, 1421 (1977). See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S.
213, 214-15 (1973) (per curiam) (complete Rule 11 transcript does not necessarily
foreclose defendant's entitlement to hearing in collateral proceeding).
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(g). See note 19 infra.
5. The due process protections find their constitutional basis in the fact that a
plea of guilty is tantamount to a conviction. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
223 (1927). In view of this drastic consequence, specified standards are set in order to
ensure fairness. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) (waiver of trial-
related rights cannot be presumed from silent plea hearing record), noted in 83 HARv.
L. REv. 181 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (supervisory
decision) (defendant must have awareness of the law in relation to facts); Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U.S. '329, 334 (1941) (defendant must understand nature of charge);
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. at 223 (dictum) (plea must be voluntarily made
after proper advice and with understanding of its consequences).
6. See Note, supra note 3, at 1414-15. The overwhelming number of federal
criminal convictions are obtained by plea. See [1976] AD. OF. OF THE U.S. COURTS
ANN. REP. 360 (84%). Judicial resources could probably not bear the increased strain
of a significant rise in the proportion of trial dispositions. See J. BOND, supra note 2, §
1.04. These considerations of judicial economy have been a major impetus behind the
sanctioning of plea bargaining. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61
(1971).
Finality is an essential concomitant to this heavy dependence on plea convictions.
Otherwise, the savings gained in nontrial adjudication are lost to the extent which
judicial resources must be allocated to dispose of post-conviction attacks on the plea.
See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1977) (state habeas). Cf. J. BOND, supra
note 2, at § 1.05 (extensive appellate litigation generated by plea process reduces its
efficacy); Note, supra at 1415 (conceding that liberal policy of allowing post-conviction
hearings, advocated in the Note, "may seem quixotic" in view of heavy dependence).
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ically affords the defendant an opportunity to plead anew.'
This presumption sweeps broadly in favor of protecting a de-
fendant's interests. Should an error in the plea-taking appear
to be clearly harmless, the presumed fact of prejudice will not
accurately reflect the reality of what actually transpired. To
the extent the presumption has this effect, it needlessly im-
pairs the finality of a plea.8
This comment will suggest a means to reduce this finality
cost. Beginning with the premise that insubstantial plea-
taking errors should be treated as harmless, the ensuing discus-
sion offers a method of segregating such errors from those which
prompted adoption of the presumed prejudice standard. A dis-
tinction should be drawn, it is argued, between errors which
raise an appreciable doubt with regard to the voluntariness of
the plea and those which do not. If an appreciable doubt ap-
pears, the presumption controls. If not, the defendant must
prove prejudice in fact in order to prevail. This selective screen-
ing of errors, it is concluded, will not significantly modify exist-
ing review, but will allow for rational disposition of technical
plea challenges.
THE PRESUMED PREJUDICE STANDARD
The Plea Hearing
The plea proceeding in federal court involves a meaningful
interchange of information between judge and defendant.' The
purpose of this colloquy is to ensure that a plea is accepted only
7. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471-72 (1969). In McCarthy, the
Court resolved a circuit conflict by adopting a view endorsed only by the Ninth Circuit.
See Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1964) (en banc). The remaining
circuits uniformly permitted the government to establish that an improperly accepted
plea was in fact made voluntarily and intelligently before invalidating it. See 1 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 172, at 366-67 (1969).
8. This finality cost in appellate review may well be offset by the increased
likelihood that trial judges will take the plea correctly in the first instance. The
McCarthy decision, by automatically penalizing any failure to comply with the rule
(as strictly construed), attempts to give meaning to the prophylactic measures embod-
ied in Rule 11. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). The discussion in
text refers to the standard's prophylactic aim as a shorthand way of designating this
attempt to strengthen the rule.
9. United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 870 (1977). Perfunctory inquiries with regard to the due process determiriations
will not satisfy the rule's requirements. See I C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, §§ 172, 174, at
369-70, 375.
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if informed, 0 voluntary," and accurate." The judge assumes
that the defendant's mind is a clean slate, upon which he must
impart knowledge regarding the nature of the charge, potential
penalties, and the rights waived by plea. 3 The judge then ex-
amines the voluntariness of the plea to verify that it was not
improperly induced.'4 This latter line of inquiry is supple-
mented by questioning which elicits the existence and terms of
any outstanding plea agreement between defendant and prose-
cutor. 5 Finally, the judge must make sufficient inquiry to sat-
10. FED. R. CalM. P. 11(c). An informed plea is one made with an awareness of
the nature of the offense, the accompanying penalties, and the rights waived by plea.
The general requirement that a plea be made with an understanding of the conse-
quences has been a long-standing due process concern. See Kercheval v. United States,
274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) (dictum). An appreciation of the waiver element is essential
because due process requires that such a waiver be knowing and intentional. Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) ("intelligent and voluntary"). See McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (dictum); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d). Strictly speaking, due process standards render a plea
involuntary if it has been induced by improper threats or promises. Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493
(1962). Some inducing factors which might at first glance appear improper are, how-
ever, sanctioned. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663, 665 (1978) (threat
to enhance charge if defendant refused terms of proposed plea bargain); North Caro-
lina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 (1970) (desire to avoid imposition of death penalty).
Some such legitimation necessarily follows from the approval of negotiated pleas.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. at 668 (inducements constitute prosecutor's negoti-
ating tools).
On the other hand, voluntariness is sometimes given a broader meaning. E.g.,
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976) (plea involuntary where defendant
unaware of elements of offense); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465-67
(1969) (classifying accuracy and intelligence elements of Rule 11 as factors relevant to
voluntariness of plea). See note 82 infra.
12. FED. R. CiM. P. 11(c), (f). An accurate plea is one made with an understand-
ing of the law in relation to the facts. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466
(1969). Due process accordingly requires that a defendant be apprised of the elements
which constitute an offense, see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976), so that
he may know whether his acts fall within the range of proscribed conduct. 394 U.S. at
467. Cf. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941) (notice of nature of charge). Rule
11 codifies this concern by requiring that a defendant be informed of and understand
the nature of the charge, see FED. R. CaM. P. 11(c), and by requiring that a judge
determine that the plea has a factual basis, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f). Both of these
are intended to facilitate the accuracy of inquiry. See Notes of Advisory Committee
on 1966 Amendments to Rules, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at
4489-90 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Advisory Committee Notes]. For a general
discussion of this inquiry, see Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misde-
meanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88
(1977).
13. FED. R. CrM. P. 11(c).
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
15. FED. R. CiM. P. 11(e).
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isfy himself that the plea has a factual basis."0
The defendant, in turn, must respond personally to all
questions asked. 7 His responses are recorded in a verbatim
transcript of the proceedings. 8 Thus, the record reflects his
state of mind at the time of the plea with respect to all due
process determinations. 9
The Need for a Strict Standard of Review
Prior to the adoption of the presumed prejudice standard,
trial judges rarely followed this meticulous Rule 11 procedure.
Typically, they would engage in cursory examinations, if any,
leaving in their wake a trail of records which shed little light
on the question of a defendant's understanding at the time of
the plea."0 These records came under increasing scrutiny as
more and more defendants began to challenge their pleas in
post-conviction proceedings.2' The glaring deficiencies in the
records compelled courts to hold post-plea hearings in order to
resolve voluntariness doubts.2
The prior review standard did nothing to discourage this
widespread noncompliance with Rule 11. Appellate courts,
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f).
17. FED. R. CaiM. P. 11(c), (d). See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,
467 (1969); United States v. Vera, 514 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1975); note 19 infra.
18. FED. R. CmM. P. 11(g).
19. In 1966, Rule 11 was amended to require that a judge address the defendant
personally in ascertaining his state of mind at the time of the plea. See 1966 Advisory
Committee Notes, supra note 12, at 4489. The amendment cleared the uncertainty over
the extent to which a judge could assume that counsel would explain to defendant the
elements of the offense and the consequences of the plea. See id.. Compare Domenica
v. United States, 292 F.2d 483, 486 (1st Cir. 1961) (error to rely on counsel's representa-
tion that plea voluntary without verifying with defendant himself) and Julian v.
United States, 236 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1956) (similar), with Nunley v. United
States, 294 F.2d 579, 580 (10th Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (counsel's presence at plea-
taking validates an otherwise erroneous procedure), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 991 (1962)
and United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 566 (D.D.C. 1959) (court may
conclude that defendant pleads voluntarily from counsel's representations). The
amended version of the rule clearly condemns any procedure which fails to produce a
complete record of a defendant's understanding at the time of the plea. McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969); United States v. Vera, 514 F.2d 102, 103 (5th
Cir. 1977).
20. See Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness and Under-
standing of Guilty Pleas, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 289, 290.
21. See generally id. at 290-91. A post-conviction attack may be made either on
direct appeal from a judgment of conviction or in a collateral proceeding to vacate
sentence brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). See J. BOND, supra note 2, §
7.26. The § 2255 remedy is exactly commensurate with the habeas corpus relief avail-
able to state prisoners. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 & n.14 (1977).
22. Note, supra note 20, at 290-91.
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applying a totality of circumstances approach, would overlook
the gaps in the record if the government could point to factors
indicating that the plea was in fact voluntarily made with an
understanding of its consequences.23 If the government was
unable to discharge its burden at the appellate level, it could
attempt to do so in a voluntariness hearing on remand. 4
This state of affairs impelled the Supreme Court, in
McCarthy v. United States,25 to adopt the presumed prejudice
standard. The Court condemned the then existing practices,
reasoning that they drained judicial resources and burdened
defendants with difficult proof problems.26 In contrast, the
Court opted for a standard of review that resolved all doubts
in the record concerning the voluntariness of the plea in favor
of the defendant.27 This newly adopted standard has the practi-
cal effect of rendering any error in the plea proceeding prejudi-
23. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 469 (1969).
24. Id. The shortcomings of the prior practice have been described as follows:
"Because the trial records on challenged pleas were largely barren of any affirmative
showing of voluntariness, other than perhaps the defendant's unresisting presence
before the trial judge, the most unimaginative of convicted defendants was able to
make allegations sufficient to, at least, require a hearing." Note, supra note 20, at 290-
91.
25. 394 U.S. 459, 471-72 (1969). The defendant in McCarthy pled guilty to willful
tax evasion, but at sentencing, made statements which cast doubt on the willfulness
of his conduct. Prior to accepting the plea, the trial judge had not determined that
defendant understood the nature of the charge. In upholding the conviction, the court
of appeals held that Rule 11 did not require a judge to address the defendant personally
in determining his understanding of the charge. The Court, holding the omission
erroneous, reversed. Id. at 467. In doing so, it emphasized the possibility that the
defendant may have been guilty of only a lesser-included offense, one which lacked a
mens rea element. Id. at 471.
26. Id. at 469-72. In criticizing post-plea voluntariness hearings, the Court em-
phasized that "[tihere is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at
the time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge
against him." Id. at 470 (emphasis in the original).
27. The Court stated:
We thus conclude that prejudice inheres in a failure to comply with
Rule 11, for noncompliance deprives the defendant of the Rule's proce-
dural safeguards that are designed to facilitate a more accurate determi-
nation of the voluntariness of his plea. Our holding that a defendant
whose plea has been accepted in violation of Rule 11 should be afforded
the opportunity to plead anew not only will insure that every accused is
afforded those procedural safeguards, but also will help reduce the great
waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on
guilty plea convictions that are encouraged, and more difficult to dispose
of, when the original record is inadequate. It is, therefore, not too much
to require that, before sentencing defendants to years of imprisonment,
district judges take the few minutes necessary to inform them of their




cial, affording a defendant who exposes the error on direct ap-
peal"8 an opportunity to enter a new plea. Thus, the standard
serves to encourage trial judges to make the constitutionally
required determination of voluntariness embodied in Rule 11.9
This procedure protects the defendant's due process interests. 0
Moreover, the strengthened record discourages, or at least per-
mits summary disposition of, the often frivolous post-
conviction attacks on the plea.3
As a result, the justification for treating any plea-taking
error as prejudicial ultimately lies in the incentive this provides
for trial judges to use proper procedures in the first instance.
In emphasizing this long-term preventative aim, the Court did
not closely analyze the more immediate impact the adopted
standard would have at the appellate level. The following sec-
tion considers this impact. Specifically, it discusses the stan-
dard's major shortcoming: its failure to afford appellate courts
sufficient latitude to uphold a plea conviction when an admit-
ted error in the plea-taking appears clearly harmless.
REVIEW OF TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
Technical Errors in a Plea Proceeding
Common sense suggests that a plea proceeding might in-
volve an entire spectrum of potential errors. Some of these
clearly would not raise the voluntariness concerns which
prompted the McCarthy Court to adopt the presumed preju-
dice standard. 2 Typically, an error not raising voluntariness
concerns involves erroneous advice given a defendant respect-
ing the consequences of his plea.
Such an error might not be material. For example, Rule 11
requires a judge to inform a defendant of the consequences of
his plea,3 and it has been deemed error to delegate any part of
28. The Court did not limit its holding to the direct appeal context, but the great
majority of circuits have so interpreted it. See notes 60-65 and accompanying text
infra.
29. The Court noted that the Rule 11 procedure is designed to assist judges in
making the due process determination that a plea is "truly voluntary" and "to produce
a complete record . . . of the factors relevant to that determination." 394 U.S. at 465.
30. Id. at 472.
31. Id. at 465, 472.
32. See note 29 supra. "Voluntariness" is here employed, as in McCarthy, in a
broad sense, so that it overlaps significantly with the intelligence and accuracy deter-
minations. See note 82 infra.
33. FED. R. CaiM. P. 11(c).
19781
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this duty to the prosecutor.34 Such an error could conceivably
raise voluntariness doubts. 5 In the usual case, however, the
error would appear harmless. Moreover, the particular facts of
the plea hearing might reinforce this conclusion. The plea may
have been offered pursuant to an agreement arrived at after
months of negotiation. The defendant, as a repeat offender,
may have ample familiarity with criminal processes. Or, the
judge may have delegated only a portion of his duties" and may
have conducted an otherwise meticulous examination.
Similarly, a material error might be rendered harmless by
subsequent events.37 Consider the case of erroneous advice with
regard to the potential maximum penalty for a particular
34. United States v. Hart, 566 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1978) (error to delegate
duty to inform defendant of nature of charge and consequences of plea). Contra,
United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (permitting
partial delegation), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 46 U.S.L.W. 3751 (June 5, 1978); United
States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d 962, 965-66 (8th Cir. 1976) (allowing trial judge to adopt
extensive record built by prosecutor), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977). This conflict
carries over from one which existed under a prior version of Rule 11, which required a
judge, prior to accepting a guilty plea, to address the defendant personally and deter-
mine that the plea was made with an understanding of its consequences. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1097 (1966). Compare United States v. Crook, 526 F.2d 708, 709-
10 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), with United States v. Yazbeck, 524 F.2d 641, 643 (1st
Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (dictum) and United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 415 &
n.7 (5th Cir. 1971) (dictum).
35. For example, a prosecutor may induce a guilty plea by striking an off-the-
record plea agreement with an uncounseled first offender. He might promise a specific
sentence, knowing that the particular judge does not accept such agreements. He
might further convince the defendant to deny the existence of the agreement in open
court as part of the "deal." In such a case, judicial interrogation might expose the
sham, along with the improper inducement, whereas prosecutorial questioning would
not.
36. He might, for example, direct the prosecutor to inform the defendant of
potential penalties. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 46 U.S.L.W. 3751 (June 5, 1978).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 572 F.2d 1284, 1285 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (error harmless where potential maximum period of incarceration failed to
exceed disclosed maximum); Keel v. United States, 572 F.2d 1135, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978)
(prejudice presumed irregardless of actual sentence imposed); United States v. Alejan-
dro, 569 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (presuming prejudice, though
total possible period of supervision actually imposed failed to exceed disclosed maxi-
mum); Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106, 111-13 (2d Cir. 1977) (error harm-
less in collateral proceeding); Bell v. United States, 521 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1975)
(error harmless on motion to vacate sentence), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976);
Bachner v. United States, 517 F.2d 589, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1975); id. at 599 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Arias v. United States, 484 F.2d 577, 578-79 (7th Cir. 1973) (failure to
advise of parole ineligibility cured by repeal of statute prior to conviction), cert denied,
418 U.S. 905 (1974); Johnson v. Wainright, 456 F.2d 1200, 1201 (5th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (sentence imposed equalled stated maximum, though court understated ac-
tual maximum). Cf. Paige v. United States, 443 F.2d 781, 783 (4th Cir. 1971) (in pre-
McCarthy case finding error where court affirmatively misled defendant).
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crime. This would normally raise voluntariness concerns, 3 but
it need not. Assume, for instance, that a defendant who faces
potentially thirty years imprisonment is told that he faces fif-
teen, but is given only a five year sentence. In such a case, the
actual penalty imposed eliminates any appreciable doubt with
respect to the effect of the error on the decision to plead
guilty2
The error may pertain to a defendant's knowledge of con-
sequences in a case where attendant circumstances raise a
compelling inference that the defendant must have been aware
of the omitted information. For example, contrary to the proce-
dures of Rule 11, a judge might fail to inform the defendant
that his right to counsel at trial is waived by the entry of a
guilty plea. Normally, this might affect the decision to plead
guilty." But what if the defendant had an attorney, previously
appointed by the court? What if he offered his plea on the eve
of trial, when he might be supposed to be aware of counsel's
trial preparation efforts? Undoubtedly, a defendant would be
aware of the undisclosed right under these circumstances.4
These examples, which are by no means exhaustive,42 dem-
38. If the penalty imposed exceeds the disclosed maximum, the plea is of course
invalid. See J. BOND, supra note 2, § 3.39 (virtually all courts agree that defendant
must know minimum and maximum sentence judge may impose).
Even if the sentence does not exceed the disclosed maximum, the plea may be
involuntary. This would be so if a plea agreement guaranteed a specific sentence and
the sentence imposed exceeded this agreed upon disposition. See United States ex rel.
Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1977) (habeas petition); United
States ex rel. Brown v. Morris, 443 F. Supp. 425, 426-27 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (same). In
such a case, the defendant might be entitled to withdraw his plea or to compel specific
performance of the agreement. See generally J. BOND, supra at § 7.19.
39. The issue is problematic, however, under the presumed prejudice standard.
Compare United States v. Turner, 572 F.2d 1284, 1285 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(applying manifest injustice test, error harmless) and Bell v. United States, 521 F.2d
713, 715 (4th Cir. 1975) (on motion to vacate sentence, error harmless), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 918 (1976), with United States v. Alejandro, 569 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (2d Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (error presumed prejudicial). Commentators have suggested that
absence of reliance on the erroneous information renders the error harmless. See J.
BOND, supra note 2, § 7.07[1] (summarizing case law); Note, supra note 20, at 317.
40. A defendant who is unaware of his right to counsel might be deterred from
exercising his right to trial by the unsettling prospect of having to face the unfamiliar
trial setting alone. This likelihood is greater if the defendant is indigent and underedu-
cated.
41. United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977). Accord, United
States v. Michaelson, 552 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 1977) (privilege against self-
incrimination).
42. A failure to mention any one of the rights waived by plea might, depending
on the circumstances, be rendered harmless if the plea is taken after or shortly prior
to commencement of trial. See United States v. Alejandro, 569 F.2d 1200, 1202 (2d Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (dictum). At issue is not so much the importance of the right as
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onstrate that the circumstances surrounding a particular plea
might remove any appreciable doubt that a particular error
affected the decision to plead guilty. Such an error can fairly
be labeled as technical.
These technical attacks43 on a plea have presented difficul-
ties when tested against the standard of presumed prejudice.
The strong inclination to uphold the plea and the competing
desire to faithfully implement the strict review standard cause
appellate courts to treat such challenges unevenly. Although
the great majority agree that they cannot apply differing review
standards in accordance with the magnitude of the error," they
the defendant's awareness of that right. The right to trial by jury, for example, is
fundamental. Ballew v. Georgia, 98 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (1978). Yet a judge's failure to
obtain an explicit waiver of that right would not prejudice a defendant who pleaded
not guilty, electing to have a jury trial, and later substituted a plea of guilty.
In the absence of compelling circumstances, however, waiver should not too read-
ily be implied. For example, an explicit waiver of the right to trial implicitly waives
the right to confront one's accusers. Arguably, the failure to inform of the subsumed
right might be cured by express mention of the greater right. See 1975 Advisory Com-
mittee Notes, supra note 3, at 1303. When Rule 11 did not require specific mention of
the rights, many courts used the implied waiver concept in order to validate a plea.
See J. BOND, supra note 2, § 3.05[1]. It will be difficult to excuse such an omission
under the amended rule, however, absent circumstances which clearly justify imputing
an awareness of the omitted right to a defendant (such as when the plea is offered after
commencement of trial). In the usual case, the implied waiver argument is probably
insufficient to cure an omission. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975),
reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 674, 679 (rejecting Advisory Com-
mittee's approach) [hereinafter cited without parallel citation as HOUSE REPORT].
43. See Aviles v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 1374, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
("sterile" attacks).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Del Prete, 567 F.2d 928, 929 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (dictum); United States v. Aldridge, 553 F.2d 922, 922 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Boone, 543 F.2d 1090, 1092 (4th Cir. 1976). These cases involved the question of
whether the advice provisions of amended Rule 11 were subject to the same strict
standard of review which governed the provisions of the rule interpreted in McCarthy.
In a slightly different context, the Eighth Circuit has excused a trial judge's
erroneous failure to inquire into the existence of a plea agreement, stating: "[Niot
every failure of a district court to comply with . . . Rule [11] entails the setting aside
of a conviction with leave to withdraw a plea of guilty." United States v. Scharf, 551
F.2d 1124, 1130 (8th Cir.) (direct appeal from denial of post-sentence motion to with-
draw guilty plea), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977). Instead of vacating the conviction,
the Scharf court remanded for an evidentiary hearing in order to determine whether
the terms of the bargain were fulfilled. This procedure, and the court's holding, appear
at odds with McCarthy. See Coody v. United States, 570 F.2d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam); notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra. The Scharf court tested the
validity of the plea against the "manifest injustice" standard outlined in FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(d). Rule 32(d) permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea for any "fair and just"
reason prior to sentencing, but only for manifest injustice thereafter. See United States
v. Morgan, 567 F.2d 479, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally J. BOND, supra note 2,
§§ 7.02-.07. However, a judge's failure to comply with the requirements for acceptance
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have implemented the controlling standard in different ways.
Some apply the strict standard regardless of the consequences.
Others employ devices by which to avoid the strictures of the
presumed prejudice standard when it would yield undesirable
results.
Inflexible Review of Technical Challenges
The inflexible model of review. Under this model45 any
deviation from the letter of Rule 11 renders the plea vulnerable.
The reviewing court limits its scrutiny to the record of the plea
proceeding" in order to determine whether there has been strict
compliance with the rule's requirements.
Regarding advice as to plea consequences, for instance, the
trial judge must go through a two-step process with respect to
each element of the rule. If he does not inform a defendant of,
and determine that he understands," the nature of the charge,4"
of a guilty plea is a recognized exception to the manifest injustice standard. Id. §
7.07[2]. Such an error must be tested against the presumed prejudice standard.
There is no express time limit for bringing a Rule 32(d) motion. It may be brought
before or after the statutory time limit for an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Thus an appeal from the denial of a Rule 32(d) motion may be treated as a direct
appeal or as a collateral attack, depending on its timeliness. In direct review, courts
continue to be bound by the presumed prejudice standard. Many courts, including the
Eighth Circuit, have refused to apply the presumed prejudice standard in collateral
proceedings. E.g., United States v. Ortiz, 545 F.2d 1122, 1123 (8th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); McRae v. United States, 540 F.2d 943, 944-45 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1045 (1977). See notes 60-65 and accompanying text infra. In excusing the
trial judge's failure to comply with Rule 11, the Scharf court incorrectly relied on these
precedents without noting the different procedural context. 551 F.2d at 1130.
45. The models discussed in text signify only general methods of approaching
any given Rule 11 issue. No one model is systematically followed in any given circuit.
Only the Fifth Circuit has recently begun to employ a nearly uniform methodology
(inflexible review). Nor do courts employ this terminology. The classification has util-
ity as an analytical tool, however, and facilitates an issue-oriented discussion of pat-
terns of review.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 174 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977).
47. In United States v. Hart, 566 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1978), the trial judge appar-
ently covered every element of Rule 11, except that he allowed the prosecutor to advise
the defendant of the nature of the charge, potential penalties, and the rights waived
by plea. Following this disclosure, the judge addressed the defendant and determined
that he understood each of these matters. The reviewing court held this procedure
erroneous, concluding that "the court must both personally inform the defendant of
the charges against him, his rights, and the consequences of his plea and personally
determine that the defendant understands these charges, rights, and consequences."
Id. at 978 (emphasis in the original). A literal, two-part inquiry with respect to each
element of the rule is also suggested in United States v. Adams, 566 F.2d 962, 964 (5th
Cir. 1978) (dictum).
48. A mere reading of the indictment will rarely serve to inform the defendant
of the nature of the charge. A judge has an affirmative duty to patiently explain the
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potential penalties,4' and each of the litany of rights waived by
plea,50 the plea is defective. Any attempt to delegate these
duties constitutes reversible error.' Should an error occur, the
plea remains vulnerable for an indefinite period of time with-
out regard to the nature of the error.5" Even if attacked collater-
elements of an offense to a defendant in lay terms. See United States v. Adams, 566
F.2d 962, 967-68 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 172 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977). It has even been suggested that jury charges
be used as guidelines. See id. at 172. However, the explanation may vary, depending
on the complexity of the crime and the sophistication of the defendant. United States
v. Adams, 566 F.2d at 967; Irizarry v. United States, 508 F.2d 960, 964-66 (2d Cir.
1974). At a minimum, the court must "at least set out the bare bone elements of the
offense." Id. at 965-66. See Coody v. United States, 570 F.2d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam) (routine questions on subject of understanding insufficient).
49. See United States v. Alejandro, 569 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (failure to adequately explain special parole term). Under the inflexible ap-
proach, the court will not consider the fact that the erroneous penalty advice was
rendered nonprejudicial by the actual penalty imposed. See id. at 1202 & n.2 (Hays,
J., dissenting).
50. See United States v. Adams, 566 F.2d 962, 966 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d
1090, 1092 (4th Cir. 1976). The extreme to which the strict construction approach lends
itself is suggested by one court's interpretation of Rule ll's command that a defendant
be informed of "the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him." See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3). "Although the right to cross-examine may be subsumed in
the confrontation right, the statute requires that both be mentioned." United States
v. Adams, 566 F.2d at 966 n.5 (dictum). The subtleness of the distinction, and the
remote impact it might have on the typical defendant's choice to plead guilty, capture
the literalness of the approach.
51. Coody v. United States, 570 F.2d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
United States v. Hart, 566 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Aldridge,
553 F.2d 922, 923 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States v. Crook, 526 F.2d 708,
709-10 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
The Fifth Circuit's refusal to permit delegation finds arguable support in a strict
reading of Rule 11, which requires "the court" to conduct the various inquiries. See
Note, supra note 1, at 1017. Instead of relying on this, however, the courts have
erroneously felt compelled to enforce the prohibition by Rule 11's command that the
court address the defendant "personally" in conducting the examination. E.g., United
States v. Crook, 526 F.2d at 709-10 (thereby regarding itself bound by the holding in
McCarthy). These courts have confused the issue of who should conduct the inquiry
with that of who should answer the questions. See United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d
1302, 1306 n.6 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 0000 (1978). The faulti-
ness of the analysis is further underscored by the fact that it upset a long-standing
circuit "rule" without mention. See Limon-Gonzalez v. United States, 499 F.2d 936,
938 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (knowledge may be imparted from any source); United
States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 415 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1971) (dictum); United States v.
Woodall, 438 F.2d 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (dictum) (interpreting version of
Rule 11 which did not require personal address).
52. Keel v. United States, 572 F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir. 1978). See Coody v.
United States, 570 F.2d 540, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (presuming prejudice
in collateral review); Sassoon v. United States, 561 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th Cir. 1977)
(same); Bunker v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (same). With the exception
of Keel, these cases do not attach special significance to the collateral procedural
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ally, the reviewing court will not consider the prejudicial effect
of the delay on the government's ability to reprosecute5 3
Inflexible review assessed. This literal implementation of
the presumed prejudice standard threatens, by its very rigidity,
to transform the plea proceeding into a ritualistic ceremony. 4
posture, suggesting that the point may not even have been briefed. See Del Vecchio v.
United States, 556 F.2d 106, 111 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977). The fact remains, however, that
these courts continue, in the face of a strong countervailing trend in the remaining
circuits, to presume prejudice in collateral review. See also Castro v. United States,
396 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1968) (en banc) (dictum).
53. Potential prejudice to the government is accorded great weight by courts
which refuse to apply the presumption in collateral attacks. E.g., Del Vecchio v.
United States, 556 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1977). Similarly, it may justify denial of a
defendant's motion to withdraw a properly accepted plea under the manifest injustice
standard of FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d). See J. BOND, supra note 2, § 7.14. The impaired
ability to retry may result from the death or disappearance of key witnesses, the loss
or destruction of material evidence, or any one of a number of other factors.
In upholding state procedural rules designed to ensure that all substantive claims
are raised at trial, the Supreme Court has remarked that defense counsel sometimes
deliberately refrain from raising claims in the hope of attacking the conviction at a
more opportune moment. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-91 (1977)
("sandbagging"). This tactic might effectively be employed in the challenge of plea-
taking procedures. In jurisdictions which presume prejudice in collateral review, one
faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt might, knowing that his plea was improperly
accepted, wait for an advantageous moment to gain the opportunity to replead.
Whether the typical defendant, or his counsel, would in fact calculate in this manner
cannot be known, but the possibility exists.
54. Of course, the congressional revision of Rule 11 prescribes an exact ritual
which is mandatory in its terms. 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.03[l][b], at 11-
64 (2d R. Cipes ed. 1977). See United States v. Adams, 566 F.2d 962, 969 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Gee, J., concurring) (amended rule intends a litany). The current formulation was,
moreover, arrived at by Congress after it considered repeated warnings by spokesmen
for the drafters of the proposed amendments that its course would ultimately prove
harmful to defendants. One spokesman cautioned:
In the view of the Advisory Committee it is not desirable to mandate
a judge to go through a long ritual which tends to get automatic and
routine. Rather, within the limits allowed by law, a judge should be given
flexibility to accomplish the objective of the rule, namely, that of ensur-
ing that the defendant is making an informed plea. In almost all cases,
defendants are represented by counsel who should share with the judge
the responsibility for informing the defendant of the consequences of his
action. In the event that a judge, in an individual case, fails to inform a
defendant of an important consequence of his plea, there is opportunity
to raise the issue in the court of appeals. There is nothing in the rule, as
proposed, which prevents the judge from adding other advice in appropri-
ate cases.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 151-52 (1975) (Prof. LaFave). See Amendments to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 194 (1975) (Prof.
Remington) ("It is far more important to tell the judge what he must do, as a mini-
mum, and to leave to the judge and to defense counsel the responsibility for giving a
defendant additional advice when the facts of a particular case makes [sic] it desira-
ble to do so.").
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A trial judge must dispense checklist justice in order to comply
with such a standard. The risk of attempting to tailor the pro-
ceeding to meet the needs of an individual defendant is great;
any failure to utter the approved language in its entirety pro-
duces a fatal misstep. 5
5
This model's singleminded literalness also erodes the ap-
pellate courts' capacity to prevent manipulation of the appel-
late process." Thus, a defendant who had unrealized expecta-
Congress explicitly rejected this flexible approach in favor of a mandatory proce-
dure. HoUsE REPORT, supra note 42, at 21. See United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633,
636 (2d Cir. 1976). Trial judges must adhere faithfully to the prescribed procedure.
The question remains, however, what is to be done when a judge concededly fails to
do so? This is a distinct issue which is not mooted by the 1975 amendments. But see 8
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra at 11.03[1][b] (suggesting that question now
appears academic).
The statement in text is intended to suggest that mechanical resort to the pre-
sumption of prejudice exacerbates the shortcomings of current procedure by removing
whatever leeway is still allowed by Congress. Cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 467 n.20 (1969) (refusing to superadd more specific guidelines than those required
by Rule 11 itself). As one court has noted in interpreting the amended provisions:
Congress meant to strip district judges of freedom to decide what they
must explain to a defendant who wishes to plead guilty, not to tell them
precisely how to perform this important task in the great variety of cases
that would come before them. While a judge who contents himself with
literal application of the Rule will hardly be reversed, it cannot be sup-
posed that Congress preferred this to a more meaningful explanation,
provided that all the specified elements were covered.
United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis in the original).
See United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir.) (ritualistic compliance with
Rule 11 not required), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
55. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra. In order to minimize this risk,
some courts are advising trial judges to adopt sets of instructions detailing the advice
requirements, see United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 1976), or to use
jury charges as a means of explaining the elements of an offense, see United States v.
Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977). While such
devices might help insulate the plea from subsequent attack, see United States v. Saft,
558 F.2d 1073, 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), their value to a defendant is questionable. See Note,
supra note 20, at 294 ("The fault of a questionnaire lies in the ease by which its use
can slip into a mechanistic, prophylactic procedure with its user becoming an inactive
participant."). Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 77 (1977) (discounting value of
form waiver signed by defendant prior to entering plea).
56. The use of the term "manipulation" is not intended to connote that defen-
dants who avail themselves of current law, albeit for technical objections, are somehow
abusing the appellate process. They may, of course, utilize any means authorized by
law to contest the legality of their plea. The term is instead intended to highlight the
case where a defendant wishes to gain a second opportunity to plead for reasons
unrelated to the plea-taking error. The reason may be any one of many, ranging from
a simple change of mind to disappointment over an unexpectedly severe sentence.
Diisatisfaction with sentence probably accounts for many post-conviction chal-
lenges. See Comment, Profile of a Guilty Plea: A Proposed Trial Court Procedure for
Accepting Guilty Pleas, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 1195, 1195 n.7 (1971). This may be due to
the fact that most plea agreements, such as charge dismissals and sentence recommen-
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tions of sentencing leniency may gain a second opportunity to
plead by simply challenging the plea proceeding, even though
he could not likely prove an abuse of discretion were he to
attack the sentence directly. This is undesirable if the pur-
ported error appears clearly harmless and if the attack is moti-
vated solely by frustrated sentencing hopes.
In addition, this mode of review may, by its disregard of
the finality principle, promote as many post-conviction attacks
as did the pre-McCarthy practice of accepting pleas in a sum-
mary manner.57 Thus, instead of challenging a woefully inade-
quate record under a flexible review standard, as was the pre-
McCarthy practice, a defendant now simply attacks minor de-
ficiencies under a strict standard in order to gain the opportun-
ity to enter a new plea. When implemented in this manner, the
presumed prejudice standard does not reduce the number of
post-conviction attacks, as the McCarthy Court intended, but
merely shifts the basis of such an attack."
The inflexible approach, in attempting to faithfully adhere
to the presumed prejudice standard, overprotects a defendant's
due process interests. The price is paid in terms of finality.
This approach fails to recognize that appellate courts must
strike some balance between protecting a defendant's interests
dations, do not guarantee to a defendant a particular sentence, but rather only estab-
lish the parameters within which the judge can decree a result. See J. BOND, supra note
2, §§ 1.07[31-1.07[5]. So long as the sentence imposed falls within the authorized
limits,'a defendant can hardly prove an abuse of discretion. In cases where they are
not bound by the presumed prejudice standard, courts will frequently refuse to invali-
date a plea when they suspect that the challenge is motivated by frustrated sentencing
hopes. E.g., United States v. Kay, 537 F.2d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963). See J. BOND, supra at §
7.15; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
Whatever his motive, however, a defendant does not have an absolute right to
withdraw his plea, even prior to sentencing. J. BOND, supra at § 7.02[1]. See United
States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1082-83 (2d Cir. 1977) (in pre-sentence withdrawal,
government need not show prejudice if defendant fails to advance sufficient grounds
for permitting withdrawal). "Manipulation," as used in text, signifies the use of a
technical error in the plea-taking, in conjunction with the presumption of prejudice,
in order to circumvent these restrictions on the right to replead.
57. See notes 20-25 supra.
58. The finality toll is even greater now than under prior practice. Formerly, a
defendant's statement at the plea-taking that he desired to plead guilty would consti-
tute an often insurmountable prima facie case for voluntariness. See McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 469 (1969); Heberling, Judicial Review of the Guilty Plea,
7 LINCOLN L. Rxv. 137, 199 n.247 (1972). Though costly to defendants, this prima facie
case would likely insulate the plea from successful attack. In contrast, a defective plea
tested against the presumed prejudice standard is automatically invalidated. Thus,
while the former practice may have generated numerous profitless post-conviction
attacks, the inflexible model of review affords many genuine opportunities to replead.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
and promoting the rational administration of justice. 9 In losing
sight of this fact, it proves unworkable in a criminal justice
system so heavily dependant on plea convictions.
Flexible Review of Technical Challenges
The majority of appellate courts employ either, or both, of
two dissimilar means in order to offset the finality cost of the
presumed prejudice standard. If a plea is attacked collaterally,
they disregard the presumption and require a showing of actual
prejudice before vacating the sentence. Conversely, if a plea is
attacked on direct appeal, they use interpretive means to at-
tain the functional equivalent of a harmless error doctrine.
Reinstatement of prejudice standard in collateral
proceedings. In collateral review, most appellate courts will not
apply the presumed prejudice standard. 0 The rationale for this
position is bottomed on the fact that the Supreme Court
adopted the standard in a case involving a direct appeal. Rely-
ing on a subsequent Supreme Court dictum in Davis v. United
States,' the courts have been quick to distinguish collateral
attacks because of their differing procedural posture.2
59. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
60. See United States v. White, 572 F.2d 1007, 1009 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hamilton, 553 F.2d 63, 65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); United States
v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977); McCrae v. United States, 540 F.2d
943, 945 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977); Bachner v. United States,
517 F.2d 589, 592.93 (7th Cir. 1975). Cf. Bell v. United States, 521 F.2d 713, 714 (4th
Cir. 1975) (reviewing motion to vacate sentence, court endorses harmless error without
considering appropriate standard of review), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976). Those
circuits which have applied the presumption in collateral review have normally done
so without expressly considering the propriety of the standard in that context. See Del
Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d at 111 n.8 (citing cases). But see Keel v. United
States, 572 F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir. 1978); Castro v. United States, 396 F.2d 345, 349
(9th Cir. 1968) (en banc) (dictum).
61. 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974), noted in 88 HAiiv. L. Rav. 213 (1974). The Davis
Court stated that a failure to comply with the formal requirements of a rule of criminal
procedure did not warrant collateral relief, absent any indication "that the defendant
was prejudiced by the asserted technical error." 417 U.S. at 346. The standard adopted
for a showing of prejudice was "whether the claimed error was 'a fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and whether '[i]t . ..
presentis] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the
writ of habeas corpus is apparent.' " Id. (dictum) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
62. The distinction had been recognized in the Rule 11 context prior to Davis.
See Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concur-
ring in result). Though perceived by an occasional judge, the courts overlooked it and
continued to presume prejudice in collateral review. See, e.g., Irizarry v. United States,
508 F.2d 960, 964 (2d Cir. 1974). In view of the nearly unanimous reinstatement of the
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In making this distinction, these courts recognize the need
to accord some degree of finality to pleas attacked long after
accepted. 3 Differing standards are employed in the respective
circuits, 4 but all require a collateral petitioner to demonstrate
that an asserted plea-taking error prejudiced him in some ma-
terial way.6"
Interpretive avoidance in direct appeals. In direct review,
the binding effect of the presumed prejudice standard cannot
be disregarded. Accordingly, many courts use interpretive
means to indirectly achieve results which might have been
reached directly under a harmless error doctrine.
Given compelling facts, these courts avoid the rigors of the
presumed prejudice standard through the process of characteri-
zation. The technique is familiar to all lawyers and judges. In
the review of plea proceedings, it operates as follows. A finding
of error is fatal to the plea. The reviewing court has no discre-
tion to uphold the conviction once a departure from established
procedure is characterized as error. However, the court may
prejudice standard since Davis (beginning with Gates v. United States, 515 F.2d 73,
80 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum)), the pre-Davis pattern is probably best explained by the
fact that courts felt bound by McCarthy's broad language and simply did not venture
to second-guess the Supreme Court.
63. The reasoning of these cases is exemplified by Judge Feinberg who, after
describing Rule l's defendant-protective purpose, stated:
On the other hand, rigid enforcement of the Rule many years after the
plea has been taken erodes the principle of finality in criminal cases and
may allow an obviously guilty defendant to go free because it is impossi-
ble, as a practical matter, to retry him. . . .This is not a result that
commends itself to many people, including judges. Accordingly, courts
have been struggling-in the last few years particularly-to accomodate
this clash of policies in applying the Rule.
Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations and footnote
omitted). These considerations do not apply in direct review; in that context, "[tihe
price of a short delay and some extra expense is a modest one to pay to correct the
error of a government official (a district judge)." Id.
64. Id. (outlining the various tests). See also Aviles v. United States, 405 F.
Supp. 1374, 1379-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
65. See cases cited note 60 supra. The concept of harmless error is embodied in
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a), and applies generally to all federal procedural rules. Only in
the plea-taking area have the courts carved out a firm exception. See, e.g., United
States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1976) (guilty plea is "special"). The
reinstatement of the prejudice standard in collateral review represents a significant
inroad on this excepted area, underscoring the importance of the finality principle.
Parenthetically, finality concerns figured prominently in the Supreme Court's
refusal to apply McCarthy retroactively. See Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831,
833 (1969) (per curiam) (emphasizing large number of constitutionally valid convic-
tions that may have been obtained without full Rule 11 compliance). Cf. Castro v.
United States, 396 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1968) (en banc) (denying retroactive applica-
tion to a circuit rule of presumed prejudice).
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interpret the language of Rule 11 in any reasonable manner.
Whenever the language is susceptible to more than one inter-
pretation, an apparent departure from the letter of the rule
may be characterized as a form of marginal compliance."6 Since
66. As one commentator has pointed out: "The cases are legion in which courts
have held that McCarthy dictates that the record show 'full' compliance with [Rule
11]. . . . What constituted full compliance proved more troublesome, however." J.
BOND, supra note 2, § 3.05[1].
Until its revision in 1975, the nebulous language of Rule 11 reflected little more
than the broad commands of due process. In relevant part, it read:
The court . . . shall not accept [a plea of guilty] without first addressing
the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntar-
ily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences
of the plea. . . . The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of
guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1097 (1966).
Given its generality, it is hardly remarkable that courts could interpret it in such
a manner as to reach desired results. The classic instance involves the narrow reading
given to the word "consequences" and the resulting exclusion of many indirect conse-
quences from the advice requirements of the rule. See J. BOND, supra at §§ 3.05[21,
3.38.
The use of interpretation as a genuine outcome-determinative device, however,
becomes manifest in two special situations. The first involves specific Rule 11 language
which is given a liberal reading in a close case. E.g., United States v. Hamilton, 568
F.2d 1302 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 46 U.S.L.W. 3751 (June 5,
1978). In Hamilton, the judge carefully advised the defendant with regard to all Rule
11 matters except penalties. The prosecutor provided the penalty information and
the judge determined on the record that the defendant understood that advice. Neither
the judge nor the prosecutor informed the defendant of the possibility of consecutive
sentences, though the prosecutor separately described the penalties on each of the two
counts. The court found this procedure consistent with Rule 11's command that the
court "address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and deter-
mine that he understands . . . the maximum possible penalty provided by law." See
FED. R. CrIM. P. 11(c)(1). In sanctioning the partial delegation of the judge's disclosure
duties, it concluded that "[riequiring the court to inform a defendant of penalties
does not necessarily mean that the words must literally issue from the judge's lips."
568 F.2d at 1306. Regarding the failure to advise of the possible cumulation of sent-
ences, the court concluded that the implicit explanation contained in the separate
description of penalties on each count sufficiently apprised the defendant of the maxi-
mum possible penalty. Id. at 1306. Cf. Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 415
(3d Cir. 1973) (interpreting pre-amendment version of rule). For other cases of this first
variety, see Kloner v. United States, 535 F.2d 730, 734 (2d Cir.) (reviewing court strains
to excuse trial judge's failure to ascertain factual basis for plea), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
942 (1976); United States v. Brogan, 519 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(substantial compliance found, though judge failed to explain nature of charge), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975); United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 86-87 (5th Cir.)
(pre-amendment command that judge determine that defendant understands nature
of charge satisfied when judge, though failing to mention charge at plea-taking, had
presided over mistrial of same defendant on identical charge), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1032 (1975).
A more ingenious use of interpretation is found in the type of case in which specific
Rule 11 language has been strictly construed by one panel and a subsequent panel in
the same circuit faces a minor error on the point. Compare United States v. Journet,
544 F.2d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 1976) (defendant must be specifically informed of "each and
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no error is found, the presumption does not come into play. By
making use of this device, courts can give effect to an un-
acknowledged harmless error doctrine whenever the strict re-
view standard would yield undesirable results. 7
Flexible review assessed. The flexible approach strikes a
balance between protecting a defendant's due process interests
and giving effect to finality concerns. The reinstatement of the
prejudice standard"5 in collateral proceedings gives explicit rec-
every" enumerated right waived by plea) and United States v. Crook, 526 F.2d 708,
709-10 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (no delegation permitted), with United States v.
Michaelson, 552 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 1977) (failure to advise of privilege against self-
incrimination; to vacate conviction solely on this ground would be "needlessly rigid"
reading of Rule 11 and Journet) and United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 173 &
n.ll (5th Cir.) (prosecutor explains nature of charge, verified by judge to be accurate;
plea upheld despite delegation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977). But see United
States v. Alejandro, 569 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (error which is
rendered harmless by actual penalty imposed is presumed prejudicial by post-
Michaelson panel).
These cases, taken together, strongly suggest that what might be styled a failure
to comply with Rule 11 can indeed be overlooked, notwithstanding the McCarthy
Court's statement that "any noncompliance with Rule 11 is reversible error." 394 U.S.
at 464 n.9.
67. Being bound by McCarthy, the courts do not articulate the fact that they are
avoiding the effect of the presumed prejudice standard. That this at least partially
explains the results reached is evident from several factors. First, the cases finding
marginal compliance typically involve compelling facts: a meticulous examination
coupled with a slight departure from prescribed procedure. See note 75 and accompa-
nying text infra. When this is not the case, the plea will fall, notwithstanding the
court's belief that the error was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d
1090, 1091 (4th Cir. 1976). Secondly, whenever courts are not bound by McCarthy, they
readily acknowledge the harmlessness of errors of the type sometimes classified as
marginal procedures in direct review. See, e.g., Bachner v. United States, 517 F.2d 589,
592-93 (7th Cir. 1975) (collateral review) (error cured by subsequent events); Davis v.
United States, 470 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1972) (pre-McCarthy plea) (no harm in
delegating some of judge's duties).
68. In spite of all it has to commend it, justification of this development under
McCarthy remains problematic. The Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue,
though it has denied certiorari in several of the cases. See United States v. Hamilton,
553 F.2d 63 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); McRae v. United States, 540
F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). The uncertainty stems from
the fact that the McCarthy Court did not purport to limit its holding to the precise
procedural context it faced. On the contrary, the purposes underlying the presumption,
along with its defendant-protective concerns, suggest an expansive application. More-
over, one month after McCarthy was decided, the Court denied relief in a collateral
attack on nonretroactivity grounds, but did not otherwise intimate that relief was
unavailable. See Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 833 (1969) (per curiam).
In spite of all this, the present Court is likely to approve of the reinstatement of
the prejudice standard in collateral review. The trend originated with a dictum by the
Court, see note 61 supra, and has since gained a near unanimity in the circuits, see
note 60 supra. Furthermore, it is consistent with other recent trends on the Court. See,
e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (cutback in habeas corpus relief);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (same). Cf. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 113 (1977) (inflexible exclusionary rules now disfavored).
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ognition to the finality principle." Because the interest in final-
ity outweighs the defendant's interest when the magnitude of
the error is not great, appellate courts have sufficient latitude
to dispose of technical attacks. This discourages frivolous post-
conviction attacks without altogether depriving a defendant of
a remedy.70 It also protects the societal interest in convicting
the factually guilty by taking into account the government's
weakened ability to reprosecute after the lapse of time.7'
Interpretive avoidance, in turn, gives silent recognition to
the finality principle when a plea is challenged directly. Even
though the prejudice to the government in having to reprose-
cute is not likely to be great,7" the use of the technique mani-
fests a reluctance to overturn a plea for insubstantial reasons.7"
This gives an added dimension of durability to pleas that dis-
courages technical challenges. Moreover, it prevents manipula-
tion of the appellate process by defendants seeking a second
opportunity to plead for reasons unrelated to the plea-taking
error.74
Significantly, flexible review does not greatly impair the
utility of the presumption as a device by which to regulate
plea-taking procedures at the trial level. Removing the pre-
sumption from collateral review leaves intact its more timely
felt impact in the direct appeal context. In contrast, the pros-
pect of reversal in the distant future has uncertain impact on
trial court behavior.
Similarly, in direct appeals, interpretive avoidance is
employed cautiously in order to safeguard McCarthy's prophy-
69. See note 63 supra.
70. Cf. Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 833 (1969) (per curiam) (availa-
bility of alternative remedy partly justifies refusal to give McCarthy retroactive appli-
cation).
71. See note 63 supra. A factually guilty defendant is one who commits a volun-
tary act (defined as criminal) with the requisite intent. See Barkai, supra note 12, at
99. Although a defendant's offer to plead guilty does not always ensure that he is in
fact guilty, see id. at 100 & n.72, the correlation is probably sufficiently high that
factual guilt can be presumed in the normal case.
72. See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1977).
73. This reluctance can probably be attributed to the fact that there is no abso-
lute right to withdraw a plea of guilty, either before or after sentencing. See note 56
supra. It becomes most apparent when a court upholds a plea in a direct appeal from
the denial of a pre-sentence motion to withdraw. See United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d
1073, 1081 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Michaelson, 552 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 1977).
Normally, such a motion is routinely granted. United States v. Morgan, 567 F.2d 479,
493 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (even if plea properly accepted, withdrawal to be "freely allowed"
and granted "as a matter of course").
74. See note 56 supra.
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lactic aim. An appellate court will excuse an apparent depar-
ture from Rule 11 procedure only if compliance is meticulous
and the departure slight and clearly harmless.75 It will, more-
over, add a stern warning that trial judges are best advised to
follow the better practice of complying literally with Rule 11.76
Such sparing use should not lessen the incentive for careful
compliance.
Though the flexible approach weakens the absolute pro-
phylactic effect of the presumed prejudice standard, it remains
faithful to the McCarthy analysis. In an important caveat, the
McCarthy Court emphasized that matters of reality, not mere
ritual, were to control in the review of plea proceedings." Flexi-
ble review gives reasonable effect to this precaution without
defeating the purpose of the strict review standard.
Limits on flexible review in direct appeals. In direct ap-
peals, the mandatory Rule 11 language and the strict review
standard have the combined effect of greatly lessening the ca-
pacity of appellate courts to uphold a plea when a technical
error is challenged." In such a case, the court can scarcely find
marginal compliance in the face of a clear, though technical,
violation of the rule.
Thus, a court's capacity to modify the prima facie mean-
75. E.g., United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 46 U.S.L.W. 3751 (June 5, 1978); United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073
(2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 214 (1977). But cf. United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.) (though compli-
ance questionable, result probably justified by extreme facts), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1032 (1975).
76. E.g., United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 46 U.S.L.W. 3751 (June 5, 1978); United States v. Coronado,
554 F.2d 166, 173-74 nn. 11 & 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977); Kloner
v. United States, 535 F.2d 730, 734 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976); United
States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975); Parad-
iso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 413-15 (3d Cir. 1973). The practice of upholding a
plea while chastizing the trial court's conduct in the particular case comports with
recognized principles of appellate review. In discussing post-trial appeals, one com-
mentary explains these considerations as follows:
The aim of securing technical regularity must . . . be tempered by the
aim of preserving the judicial system's capacity to reach effective and
final decision. When an appellate court encounters procedural irregular-
ity that is harmless in the case before it but which should not be con-
doned, its opinion may properly give guidance for future cases.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11, Commentary at 21 (Approved
Draft, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA APPELLATE STANDARDS].
77. See 394 U.S. at 467 n.20; notes 102-103 infra.
78. This combined impact was virtually nonexistent under the pre-1975 version
of the rule. See note 66 supra. Ever since the rule was amended to prescribe a set ritual,
see note 54 supra, the problem has frequently cropped up. See cases cited note 44
supra.
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ing of Rule 11 is inherently limited. It can rationally bend the
language of the rule only so far. If the language is vague, in-
terpretive means can be utilized to reach desired results.9 If
clear and specific, however, the wording must be completely
disregarded in order to uphold the plea. At this point, the court
must draw the line.
The limits become strikingly evident with regard to a
judge's duty to advise of the rights waived by plea. Any failure
to mention the entire litany of enumerated rights violates Rule
ll's clear command that this be done. 0 Little interpretive flexi-
bility remains by which to excuse the failure.
In such a case, if the omission appears to be clearly harm-
less, the presumed prejudice standard puts the reviewing court
in the untenable position of either vacating a conviction on
technical grounds or of openly recognizing a harmless error
doctrine.' Neither choice seems palatable-the former because
it appears to give the defendant an undeserved chance to re-
plead, the latter because it seems to defy a clear mandate of
the Supreme Court.
The following section proposes a method by which to elim-
inate this technical basis of attack in direct appeals. In giving
limited recognition to a harmless error doctrine, the proposal
seeks to cure the review standard's occasionally undesirable
impact at the appellate level. In outlining the advantages of
the proposed cure, the section concludes that it can be imple-
mented consistently with the McCarthy analysis.
A PROPOSED THRESHOLD TEST
The Suggested Analysis
The difficult problems raised by technical attacks in direct
appeals can be resolved by requiring that a threshold test be
met before the presumption of prejudice attaches. This barrier,
properly limited, will screen nonmeritorious claims without
lessening a trial judge's incentive to comply with Rule l's
prophylactic measures.
79. See note 66 supra.
80. The rule commands that a judge inform a defendant, and determine that he
understands, the following: right to counsel (if unrepresented); right to plead not guilty(or to persist in that plea); right to jury trial, along with right to counsel; right of
confrontation and cross-examination; privilege against self-incrimination; and right to
court trial. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(c)(2), (3), (4).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Michaelson, 552 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1977).
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The suggested approach calls for a two-part analysis. The
reviewing court must initially determine whether an asserted
plea-taking error raises an appreciable doubt with regard to the
voluntariness"2 of the plea. An appreciable doubt is raised when
the error creates a possibility that a normal defendant might
not have pled guilty but-for the error. If this threshold test is
met, the presumption of prejudice controls and automatically
affords the defendant an opportunity to plead anew. If not, the
defendant may still attempt to demonstrate that, given his
special circumstances, the error in fact affected his decision to
plead guilty. 3
The test has two notable features. First, the appreciable
doubt standard erects a minimal barrier between the defen-
dant and the presumption. The mere possibility of doubt will
trigger the presumption. It is irrelevant that the reviewing
court concludes that the error probably did not affect the deci-
sion to plead guilty. This low threshold strictly limits the test's
screening function. In applying the test, an appellate court
may preliminarily examine the record before it in order to iso-
late for special treatment only the unusual case involving a
slight Rule 11 error which appears prima facie harmless. In the
overwhelming number of cases, the presumption of prejudice
will remain operative.
Second, although the threshold is low, it is objectively
framed. Its initial screening function would be impaired if the
court was forced to consider subjective factors in the first in-
stance. The objective formulation is also unlikely to harm the
defendant's interests. It has no effect unless the error is prima
facie harmless. Once triggered, it can at worst deny to a defen-
82. The term "voluntariness" is employed in a broad, generic sense, encompass-
ing all factors that bear on the rationality of a plea, i.e., those affecting a defendant's
informed choice to plead guilty. See J. BOND, supra note 2, §§ 3.01[2], 3.02
("voluntary-intelligent" formula); Barkai, supra note 12, at 91 n.16. Under this usage,
the inquiries traditionally classified as voluntariness, intelligence, and accuracy may
be subsumed to a large extent under the voluntariness heading. See Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 & n.13 (1976); id. at 653-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This
appears to be the usage employed by the McCarthy Court. See 394 U.S. at 465-66
(discussing the factors relevant to the "voluntariness determination"). For example,
the Court classified intelligence and accuracy factors as bearing on voluntariness when
it said: "[Blecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal
criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an under-
standing of the law in relation to the facts." Id. at 466 (footnote omitted).
83. This burden may reasonably be imposed on the defendant in this limited
class of cases. Apart from instances where the presumption of prejudice governs, he
normally bears the burden of justifying a plea withdrawal. J. BOND, supra note 2, §
7.11.
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dant the benefit of the presumption and put him to his proof.
Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to require a
defendant to demonstrate that his case falls outside the norm.
The notion of appreciable doubt may be illustrated by a
series of examples. Assume that a judge erroneously delegates
a substantial portion of his disclosure duties to the prosecutor
so that the prosecutor in effect conducts the entire Rule 11
examination. 4 Such an error would raise an appreciable doubt
with regard to the voluntariness of the plea. The possibility
exists that a reasonable defendant might not have pled guilty
but-for the atmosphere of subtle coercion created'by extensive
prosecutorial questioning. 5 While this seems improbable, it is
not for the reviewing court to engage in such speculation in the
face of a clear violation of Rule 11.8
Consider also the case where the judge conducts the entire
examination, except that he delegates the duty to disclose sev-
eral of the rights waived by a plea. 7 Although this might vio-
late the letter of Rule 11, an atmosphere of subtle coercion can
hardly be said to permeate the proceeding.88 In this instance,
an appreciable doubt is not raised. The possibility that the
error might have affected the decision of a normal defendant
to plead guilty is nonexistent. Any speculative doubt which
might exist would be insufficient to survive the objective prong
of the threshold test. The defendant would have to prove, with-
out benefit of the presumption, that the remote possibility of
doubt was real in his particular case.
An identical analysis would govern a judge's failure to
mention one of the enumerated rights. For example, a failure
to advise of the right to counsel would, because of the import-
ance of the right, normally raise an appreciable doubt with
regard to the voluntariness of the plea.8" But the threshold
84. See cases cited note 51 supra.
85. United States v. Crook, 526 F.2d 708, 710 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). See
United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (dictum), cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3751 (June 5, 1978). But cf. United States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d
962, 965-66 (8th Cir. 1976) (authorizing substantial interrogation by prosecutor without
considering possible intimidating effect), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977).
86. One of the announced aims of the McCarthy standard is to eliminate the
need for such speculation. See 394 U.S. at 471 (scrupulous compliance removes need).
87. See United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (penal-
ties), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 46 U.S.L.W. 3751 (June 5, 1978); United States v. Hart,
566 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1978).
88. See United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.?d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (by implication), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 46 U.S.L.W. 3751 (June 5, 1978). But
see United States v. Hart, 566 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1978).
89. In the sense that it would bear on an informed choice whether or not to plead
guilty. See note 82 supra.
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barrier would remove the presumption of prejudice in a case
where the plea had been offered after commencement of trial
by a defendant represented by counsel."0 Any appreciable
doubt is, in such a case, dispelled by the circumstances sur-
rounding the plea.
Similarly, a failure to advise of the nature of the charge
would routinely raise an appreciable doubt." But this should
not be so if the plea were offered after the conclusion of a
mistrial on the identical charge.2
Comparison with Current Flexible Review
The appreciable doubt standard will perform the same
selective screening function presently achieved by interpretive
techniques. It will ferret out those cases in which application
of the presumption leads to seemingly irrational results. In so
doing, it serves the same need as does interpretive avoidance.
It gives added durability to the plea by insulating it from in-
substantial attacks. This in turn discourages such attacks and
helps prevent manipulation of the appellate process. In short,
it lessens the sometimes undesirable impact that the presumed
prejudice standard may have on appellate review of plea pro-
ceedings by injecting into that review an element of common
sense realism.
But it does so more effectively than does the interpretive
process. It is, first of all, more forthright in its assessment of
any Rule 11 error. Instead of bending the language of the rule
in order to find a sometimes fictional "compliance," it reaches
sensible results through a frank acknowledgement that a tech-
nical error should be treated as harmless. This permits an open
discussion of the dispositive, or persuasive, factors which pro-
duce any given result. 4 These can accordingly be assessed in
90. Cf. United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1081 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977) (plea offered
on eve of trial).
91. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464-65 (1969).
92. See United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1032 (1975).
93. See note 56 supra.
94. In the context of a motion to withdraw a properly accepted guilty plea, for
instance, courts examine such factors as the lapse of time, prejudice to the government,
dissatisfaction with sentence, absence of counsel, and the existence and terms of a plea
agreement. See J. BOND, supra note 2, §§ 7.13-.18. Other factors which are presently
considered in determining the voluntariness of a plea (age, intelligence, education,
criminal background, and length of incarceration, see id. §§ 3.27-.32) could receive
added emphasis.
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light of the concerns underlying Rule 11.1 Also, the rule itself
can be construed more soundly if the interpretive process is not
employed as an outcome-determinative device. 6 All this
should enhance consistency in decisionmaking and better in-
form litigants of the factors which go into a decision.
In addition, the threshold test will not be subject to the
language constraints which limit the utility of the interpretive
process." At present, the disposition of an appeal may turn on
the fortuity of whether the Rule 11 provision violated is worded
specifically or vaguely. If specific, the plea falls; if vague, it
may be upheld. The interpretive avoidance device is only able
to screen technical challenges if the rule's language is mallea-
ble. In contrast, the threshold test will screen any technical
challenge which fails to raise voluntariness doubts. This is so
even if the provision violated is quite explicit in its command.
For these reasons, the proposed test would appear to be the
preferred means of accomplishing a selective screening under
the presumed prejudice standard. Interpretive avoidance has
one advantage over the proposed test, however, which appel-
late courts might find decisive. It screens insubstantial claims
without having to acknowledge the idea of harmless error, an
important factor under a governing standard which purports to
abolish that concept. The following discussion considers
whether the presumed prejudice standard will permit open rec-
ognition of a limited screening function.
Justification Under Current Standard
The Supreme Court adopted the presumed prejudice stan-
dard in its supervisory capacity" and may accordingly modify
it as it deems proper. Until it chooses to act, the question
remains whether the proposed test can be reconciled with the
McCarthy standard which presently binds intermediate appel-
late courts.
The test cannot be squared with certain language in the
McCarthy opinion. The Court repeatedly stated that a failure
to comply with Rule 11 would be presumed prejudicial. It did
95. See text accompanying notes 29-31 & note 82 supra.
96. See note 66 supra. The potentially conflicting results, circuit as well as intra-
circuit, become vividly apparent in the context of the delegation issue. See cases cited
notes 34, 51, 66 & 85 supra.
97. See notes 78-81 and accomanying text supra.
98. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464 (1969).
99. Id. at 463-64 & n.9, 471-72.
[Vol. 18
GUILTY PLEAS
not intimate that some errors might be less harmful than oth-
ers. Moreover, it condemned the practice of searching the plea-
hearing record for factors by which to draw speculative infer-
ences regarding a defendant's understanding at the time of the
plea.' °° Thus, the Court appeared to reject the notion that an
error could be cured by circumstances surrounding the plea.
Finally, several circuits, applying McCarthy, have expressly
rejected the view that errors could be ranked by degree of po-
tential harm.'0'
Notwithstanding this seemingly formidable backdrop, the
McCarthy opinion can be read to authorize an appropriately
circumscribed screening device. In discussing the nature of the
inquiry required under Rule 11, the Court intimated that ap-
pellate courts carefully consider the myriad of fact patterns
which might arise in a plea proceeding.'0 2 It left to Rule 11 and
to future case law the formulation of specific guidelines to gov-
ern plea proceedings, warning that matters of reality, not mere
ritual, were to control in the review of plea proceedings.' 3
Thus, the Court set forth a broad policy formulation, but
gave lower courts sufficient leeway to implement it so as to do
justice in any particular case. That the sweeping language was
not meant to be read in a vacuum is evident from the fact that
applying the presumption without regard to matters of reality
does not discourage post-conviction attack. Instead, it merely
shifts the basis of the challenge.' 0 It is therefore imperative
that reviewing courts give meaningful effect to the Court's ca-
veat.
The most effective way of doing this is through explicit
100. Id. at 464-67.
101. See cases cited note 44 supra.
102. 394 U.S. at 467 n.20. See Note, supra note 20, at 292.
103. 394 U.S. at 467 n.20. In affording this leeway, the McCarthy Court implic-
itly recognized the need to implement the presumed prejudice standard in accordance
with varying fact patterns. This is consistent with sound appellate practice. One com-
mentary remarks:
The appellate courts have two functions: to review individual cases to
assure that substantial justice has been rendered, and in connection
therewith to develop the law for general application in the legal system
... . [Tlhese functions are to an important degree differentiated. The
intermediate appellate court has primary responsibility for review of indi-
vidual cases . . . [Tihe supreme court exercises a function of selective
review, the purposes of which are to maintain uniformity of decision
among subordinate courts and to reformulate decisional law in response
to changing conditions and social imperatives.
ABA APPELLATE STANDARDS, supra note 76, § 3.00, Commentary at 4.
104. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
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sanction of a device which ferrets out insubstantial challenges.
This will do no more than make explicit what many courts are
presently doing anyway; and, as noted earlier, it has decided
advantages over current practice.'05
Moreover, the proposed test specifically tracks the factors
which motivated the Court to adopt the presumed prejudice
standard. The Court sought to ensure that plea hearing records
reflected a plea's voluntariness and all factors relevant to that
determination.'"' The proposed test, in screening only those
cases in which no appreciable doubt is raised with regard to the
voluntariness of the plea, will not conflict with the concerns
underlying the presumed prejudice standard.
Nor will it resurrect the problems which existed under the
pre-McCarthy review standard. Because the test tracks the
Court's concerns, it necessarily gives very limited recognition
to the concept of harmless error. This narrow recognition differs
substantially from the pre-McCarthy practice of permitting the
government to prove that any plea-taking error was harmless.107
Its narrow scope should adequately safeguard the defendant's
due process interests. 0 Moreover, a post-plea voluntariness
hearing rarely will have to be held in order to resolve disputed
facts. Normally, the objective prong of the threshold test will
permit screening at the appellate level, obviating the necessity
for a remand.
Finally, the threshold test will not contravene the pre-
sumption's prophylactic purpose. The appreciable doubt stan-
105. See notes 93-97 and accompanying text supra.
106. 394 U.S. at 465-67. The importance of limiting the presumption to errors
that are in some way material is underscored by the fact that this was done by the
first court of appeals to adopt a standard of presumed prejudice. See Heiden v. United
States, 353 F.2d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1965) (en banc). The McCarthy Court endorsed the
reasoning of Heiden, but made no mention of the materiality requirement. See 394
U.S. at 468-70.
107. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
108. A harmless error rule has its most pernicious effect on a defendant's rights
when it permits a reviewing court to engage in "unguided speculation" with regard to
the prejudicial impact of an error. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1181(1978) (presuming prejudice where harmless error rule not susceptible to "intelligent,
even-handed application"). Such a rule is thus normally applied only to trial errors,
which have a more "readily identifiable" scope. Id.; see id. at 1180 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (majority presumes prejudice because of "the difficulty of a post-hoc reconstruc-
tion of the record"). Implicit in the Holloway Court's reasoning, and supportive of the
text, is the approval of a harmless error rule which permits a reviewing court to
intelligently assess the prejudicial effect of an error. The proposed test, having limited
scope and applied only to open-court proceedings which are recorded verbatim, is
capable of such application.
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dard is so readily met that trial judges will retain ample incen-
tive to comply closely with proper plea-taking procedures. 109
Thus, an appellate court may implement the proposed test
consistently with the McCarthy analysis. The Court's precau-
tion that matters of reality should control sufficiently author-
izes the use of a selective screening device which neither con-
flicts with the underlying concerns of the presumed prejudice
standard nor impairs its prophylactic aim. Furthermore, the
Court's sweeping language did not prevent lower courts in col-
lateral proceedings from refusing to apply the standard when
its aims would not be furthered and its costs would be too
high. 10 This analog could also be utilized by intermediate ap-
pellate courts in refusing to apply the standard to the proposed
limited class of direct appeals."'
CONCLUSION
The presumed prejudice standard enhances the fairness of
a federal plea proceeding and thus lessens the likelihood that
a plea conviction will be subjected to post-conviction attack.
The standard's unbending character, however, makes it imper-
ative that appellate courts initially examine the nature of a
plea-taking error before invoking the severe penalty of reversal.
Otherwise, the automatic grant of relief too readily permits the
standard to become an avenue by which plea withdrawal may
be gained for reasons unrelated to the asserted error. In terms
of finality, this proves unsatisfactory in our present criminal
justice system.
This comment offers a method of insulating pleas from
insubstantial attack whenever a defendant's legitimate due
process interests are not implicated. Under the proposed analy-
sis, appellate courts first examine the effect of a plea-taking
error before applying the presumption of prejudice. Only if the
preliminary assessment reveals doubt with regard to the volun-
tariness of the plea will the error be presumed prejudicial. Oth-
erwise, it will be treated as harmless.
This call for a more discriminating review provides needed
reform within the parameters of existing review patterns. Its
adoption will reduce the finality cost of the present standard
109. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
110. See notes 60-65 and accompanying text supra.
111. A fortiori the Supreme Court should consider realigning the standard with
these suggestions in mind whenever it reconsiders the issue.
19781
716 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
without jeopardizing its defendant-protective aims. Appellate
courts, having these considerations in mind, accomplished a
similar reform in collateral review. To do so in direct review
would give meaningful scope to the McCarthy Court's admoni-
tion that lower courts take cognizance of the realities underly-






A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contend-
ere. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation
fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(b) Nolo Contendere.
A defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the con-
sent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by the court
only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the
interest of the public in the effective administration of justice.
(c) Advice to Defendant.
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
court must address the defendant personally in open court and
inform him of, and determine that he understands, the follow-
ing:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered,
the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any,
and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney,
that he has the right to be represented by an attorney at
every stage of the proceeding against him and, if neces-
sary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist
in that plea if it has already been made, and he has the
right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right
to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to
be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will
not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading
guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court
may ask him questions about the offense to which he has
pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on
the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers
may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury
or false statement.
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(d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary.
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contend-
ere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in
open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the
result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agree-
ment. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defen-
dant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results
from prior discussions between the attorney for the government
and the defendant or his attorney.
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the
attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se
may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an
agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense,
the attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose
the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the
understanding that such recommendation or request shall
not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate
disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has
been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record,
require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a
showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is of-
fered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement,
or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until
there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence re-
port.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts
the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that
it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition
provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the
plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the par-
ties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court
or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not
bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the oppor-
[Vol. 18
GUILTY PLEAS
tunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that
if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the
disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant
than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
(5) Time of Plea Agreement Procedure. Except for good
cause shown, notification to the court of the existence of a plea
agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at such other
time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court.
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related
Statements. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph,
evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo
contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to
the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made
in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas
or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding
against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evi-
dence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to,
a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or
an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged
or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for
perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the
defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of
counsel.
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea.
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the
court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without
making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual
basis for the plea.
(g) Record of Proceedings.
A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the defen-
dant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, the record shall include, without limitation,
the court's advice to the defendant, the inquiry into the volun-
tariness of the plea including any plea agreement, and the
inquiry into the accuracy of a guilty plea.
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